However, in this election it was typically not the case that margin shifts for a given group relative to were composed of decreases in support for one major party and equivalent increases in support for the other major party. There were usually some increases in third-party voting as well. For example, among white non-college-educated voters in , there was a 5-point decrease in support for Clinton relative to Obama, a 1-point increase in support for Trump relative to Romney, and a 4-point increase in third-party voting.
Among white college-educated voters there was a 6-point decrease in support for Trump relative to Romney, a 1-point increase in support for Clinton relative to Obama, and a 5-point increase in third-party voting. Finally, among black voters there was a 5-point decrease in support for Clinton, a 3-point increase in support for Trump, and a 3-point increase in third-party voting.
Thus, even though the changes in margin between Democrats and Republicans determined the election outcomes, it should be kept in mind that increased third-party voting was frequently implicated in these margin changes. Our estimates also indicate that Obama actually carried white college-educated voters in Michigan percent while Clinton lost them, albeit narrowly, percent.
As for black support, we found a fairly sharp fall from percent in to percent in , a margin shift of 10 points against Clinton, significantly greater than the 4 points reported by the exit polls. Of these changes, by far the most significant was the white non-college-educated shift. In Pennsylvania, we found that the Democratic deficit among white non-college-educated voters increased from percent in to percent in We also found that Democrats carried white college-educated voters in both elections— percent in versus percent in —compared to the exit polls, which indicated a point loss in and only a tie in Here also the most important shift by far is the white non-college-educated shift.
If Clinton had performed as well as Obama among this group, she would have carried the state by almost 4 points instead of losing it by 0. As for white college-educated voters, we found again that both Obama and Clinton carried this group in the state— percent in and percent in —while the exit polls claimed that Obama lost white college-educated voters in and that Clinton only carried them by 10 points in Black voters in our data shifted 7 points against Clinton relative to , compared to the mere 2 points indicated in the exit polls.
If she had done as well as Obama among this group, she would have carried Wisconsin by a whopping 7 points, instead of being nosed out by Trump. The black support shift against Clinton, however, had relatively little effect; in this case, the decline in black turnout was much more important. Across these three key states, we found large shifts against Clinton among white non-college-educated voters, although typically not as large as those indicated by the exit polls.
We also found that Clinton did much better among white college-educated voters in these states than was suggested by the exit polls. In terms of black support, we estimate that the shifts in black support against Clinton were greater in all three states than was shown by the exit polls.
However, among both black and Latino voters there were significant shifts in support against Clinton—8 and 7 points, respectively. Interestingly, the shifts in white non-college-educated, black, and Latino support each disadvantaged Clinton by roughly the same amount—a little more than a point—and each of these shifts, had they not occurred, would have been close to enough to tip the state in her favor. In Iowa, the big story by a very wide margin was the shift in the white non-college-educated vote.
Our data show a massive point shift against Clinton among this group, going from a tied vote in for Obama to a percent deficit for Clinton in If this shift had not occurred, Clinton would have won the state by 5 points. In terms of voters of color, our data indicate very large shifts against Clinton among these voters, not far off the shift observed among white non-college-educated voters. However, these voter groups are so small in Iowa that these shifts had very little effect on the election outcome.
Ohio also experienced a very large shift of white non-college-educated voters against Clinton: from percent in to percent in , a margin shift of 15 points. If that had not occurred the state would have been a toss-up instead of an 8-point victory for Trump. The other support shift that had a significant effect on the outcome in the state was the decline in the Democratic margin among black voters, down 11 points from percent in to percent in North Carolina, a state where a narrow Republican advantage in became slightly larger, saw a fairly modest shift toward Republicans among white non-college-educated voters, although that increase was on top of an already massive deficit—from percent in to percent in That shift, by itself, would have made the state much closer had it not happened, but it would not have flipped the state to Clinton.
As for white college graduates, our data indicate that there was a very large shift toward Clinton in the state, from a percent deficit in to a percent advantage in —the exit polls, in contrast, showed a large Democratic deficit among this group in both elections. Among black voters, we again estimate a shift against Clinton, this time from percent to percent.
But among white college-educated voters, Clinton turned a percent deficit from into a virtual tie, percent, in In Georgia, as in Arizona, our data indicate improvements for the Democrats among both white non-college-educated and white college-educated voters. And as in Arizona, the shift toward Clinton was much larger among white college graduates, cutting a percent deficit in to percent.
That shift made the largest contribution—4 points versus 2 points from the white non-college-educated shift—to reducing the Republican victory margin in the state. Finally, in Texas, we also found improvement for the Democrats among both white non-college-educated and college-educated voters. But the shift toward Clinton among white college graduates in the state was much larger—from a percent deficit in to percent in , a margin improvement of 18 points.
But that helped Clinton to the tune of only half a percentage point. Since the election there has been a vigorous and, to our eyes, healthy debate regarding what happened in The barely concealed subtext of this conversation is an argument about what would have altered the results and how the parties should invest their time and resources in upcoming elections.
These simulations are not an endorsement of any given strategy nor should they be read as such. It may very well be the case that simulations that produce the biggest Electoral College wins or the most secure state-level margins would have been the hardest to achieve.
That said, we had two goals when selecting our simulations. First, we wanted to speak as directly as possible to some of the major narratives that have developed since the election. Many people have strong beliefs regarding what would or would not have resulted in a different election outcome and we thought it necessary that these ideas be interrogated thoroughly.
This goal accounts for our first two simulations. Second, we wanted to explore simulations that told us something interesting about the electorate or more systematic changes that were occurring nationwide. This goal is responsible for our two remaining simulations. Briefly, our four simulations answer the following questions: 8. Each square contains the new vote margin under the assumptions listed above. In short:. Recreating Black turnout and support levels would have produced a large but delicate Electoral College win for Clinton.
Some of the biggest changes observed in were concentrated among African Americans. Nationwide black turnout dropped close to 4. This drop-off, combined with higher turnout rates among other racial groups, resulted in black voters shrinking as a percentage of actual voters—13 percent versus In addition, the percentage of black voters who cast a ballot for Clinton in was about five and half points lower than the number who voted for Obama in Taking these two trends together, some have argued that Clinton could have avoided a loss if she were able to maintain prior levels of support and enthusiasm among black voters.
Our results suggest that this is correct. More than that, this scenario produces the largest Electoral College win of any simulation presented in this report. Several of the states that Obama won in —Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Florida—would have stayed Democratic under these conditions. While all of these states would have seen relatively narrow Democratic wins, Florida—a state that has been a consistent nail-biter on election night—would have gone to Clinton by just 0.
In addition, North Carolina, a state that Obama did not win in , would also have gone Democratic due to a convergence of other trends. First, the share of eligible voters who were white and non-college-educated dropped by about 2. The effect of this demographic shift was blunted by the rising turnout rates of these remaining eligible voters, but this still represents a big change in the state. Second, the voting behavior of white college-educated voters in North Carolina shifted radically between these two elections—a simultaneous shift away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic Party resulted in a majority of these voters pulling the lever for Clinton.
While this first simulation produces the largest Electoral College win out of all our simulations, this says nothing about the difficulty of achieving it. In line with the historic nature of those elections, black turnout and support for Democrats were the highest ever seen in the modern political era. It may very well be the case that recreating those levels of support and enthusiasm is unrealistic outside of that context.
In fact, the overall levels of support and turnout among African Americans in bear a striking resemblance to —the last pre-Obama election.
Rather than signifying a dramatic loss for the Democratic Party, these changes may represent a return to customary voting behaviors. Let us suppose for a moment that these difficulties are real. What if Democrats, even with a concerted effort, had only been able to split the difference between the and turnout rates and support rates of African Americans? This would not have resulted in a Democratic win; Clinton still would have lost Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
A return to just the turnout or support levels of would not have produced a win for Clinton in Recreating turnout levels would only have resulted in Democratic wins in Michigan and Wisconsin, while support levels would have netted just Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Recreating white non-college-educated support levels would have produced a large and relatively secure Electoral College win for Clinton. Another important shift observed in was among white non-college-educated voters. In aggregate, Clinton lost significant vote share among this group compared to Obama— These vote shifts, combined with the strong clustering of white non-college-educated voters in the Midwest and Appalachia see Figure 5 , played a pivotal role in the election.
Taken together, some have argued that Clinton could have avoided a loss if she were able to maintain prior levels of support among white non-college-educated voters. It not only produces a large Electoral College win, but also one that is particularly robust.
Several of the states that Obama won in —Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, and Florida—would have stayed Democratic under these conditions. In the first four of those states this simulation produces relatively robust wins, the narrowest of which is 3.
In contrast, Florida is once again an extremely narrow flip—a margin of about 5, votes making the difference between a Democratic and a Republican win. Notably, this simulation does not produce a Democratic win in Ohio despite the fact that Obama won that state in While this second simulation produces secure wins in several key states, this exercise says nothing about the difficulty of achieving it.
The first group represents individuals who identified as Democrats in and voted for Obama in the last election, but changed their party affiliation and voted for Trump or a third-party candidate in According to data from the Pew Research Center, there has been a sharp decline in the number of white voters without a college degree who identify as Democrats in the last 10 years.
The shift among white voters with some college was less dramatic—from a 4-point Republican advantage in to a point advantage in —but still represents a large change in such a short time period. The second category is made up of individuals who have traditionally identified as or voted for Republicans but voted for Obama in While people have grown accustomed to thinking about those who voted for Obama in but not Clinton in as Democratic defectors, the reality is that some portion of these voters were really Republican defectors in and have now returned to their customary voting behavior.
Taken together, there is substantial reason to think that a good portion of these white non-college-educated voters were unlikely to vote Democratic in While additional resources aimed at reaching out might have resulted in smaller shifts, it seems unlikely that any discrete intervention in would have fully recreated the margins observed in Let us assume for a moment that the difficulties described above are real.
What if Democrats, even with a concerted effort, had only been able to split the difference between the and support rates of white non-college-educated voters? Under these conditions, Clinton still would have taken Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, and therefore won the election. The size of these wins is obviously smaller, but the narrowest is still a 1. Our simulation predicts that Clinton still would have carried these three Rust Belt states, with Pennsylvania now going Democratic by a very narrow 0.
On its own, Latino support returning to its levels would not have altered the outcome of the election or the outcome of any state. The simulation clearly has the biggest effect in Florida, but results in no Electoral College change.
In many ways was about the U. No demographic exemplified that more than Latino voters. According to our analysis, the percent voting Democratic declined 3. While no one has seriously argued that the election hinged on changes in Latino voting behavior, we found this simulation worthwhile to explore given the rising influence and unique electoral features of this group. As expected, our results suggest that a return to levels of support would not have resulted in a win for Clinton.
Geographically, Latinos can almost be considered an inverse image of white non-college-educated voters. While the latter had an outsized influence on the election because of their geographic distribution, the former punches below its weight. Latino voters tend to be concentrated in a relatively small number of counties in the country and those counties tend to be located in non-swing states.
The three states with the largest percentage of Latino voters—New Mexico, California, and Texas—were uncontested in and probably will be for at least several more presidential cycles.
Of the next three—Arizona, Florida, and Nevada—only Florida is a true swing state, at least for now. That said, our simulation shows that even in this relatively high population state, Latino voters shifting back to their support levels would not have closed the gap for Clinton. It still would have missed the mark by about 5, votes. State-level demographic changes were not pivotal in , but they did create conditions that were generally more favorable for Clinton.
Absent any changes in the eligible voter population, several states that Trump won narrowly would have been much safer for him. The simulation results in no Electoral College change.
Demographics may not be destiny, but in the short term it is reasonable to quantify the effects of demographic changes on election outcomes. Our fourth simulation measures this very thing: What would the election look like if there had not been any demographic changes in the past four years? We held turnout and support rates constant, but fed them into the demographics that were observed back in The effect is nearly universal—the demographic changes observed since have created an electoral landscape that is slightly more favorable to Democrats.
Had the population somehow remained unchanged during this time period, we expect Clinton would have won the national vote by 1. While these changes did not prove pivotal in any state, the estimated effect is still rather substantial.
In our seven states of interest, this simulated population stability would have resulted in margins even more favorable for Trump. In Michigan, Wisconson, and Pennsylvania Trump could have achieved margins that were 0. Although these states were not close, Ohio and Iowa would have seen a similarly sized 0. However, North Carolina and Florida, two states undergoing relatively rapid demographic shifts, were the most affected by changes to their eligible voter population.
Absent these changes, Trump would have expanded his win by 0. Broadening our horizons slightly, a number of states were significantly more Democratic in than they would have been given a stable population. Georgia and Maryland were even more extreme, with margins around 1. Click "[Show more]" below to see a sampling of historical news articles and studies dealing with the topic of voter turnout in the United States.
The link below is to the most recent stories in a Google news search for the terms Voter turnout United States. These results are automatically generated from Google. Ballotpedia does not curate or endorse these articles. Voter turnout in United States elections - Google News. Ballotpedia features , encyclopedic articles written and curated by our professional staff of editors, writers, and researchers.
Click here to contact our editorial staff, and click here to report an error. Click here to contact us for media inquiries, and please donate here to support our continued expansion. Share this page Follow Ballotpedia. What's on your ballot? Jump to: navigation , search. Categories : Voting policy concepts and issues Election policy tracking. Voter information What's on my ballot? Search the Database Select at least one of the following criteria to start your search: About the Database.
The countries in the Voter Turnout database are included on the basis of a number of specific criteria. For more information about the selection of countries, please see the Methodology section. The Voter Turnout database contains information about elections to the parliament of the European Union carried out in the EU Member States since The organisation of the elections differs somewhat from country to country, but all elections must be carried out using a proportional electoral system.
The parliamentary elections displayed in the Voter Turnout database are elections to the national legislative body of a country or territory. In case the legislative body has two chambers, only the second lower chamber is included.
If elections are carried out in two rounds using the Two-Round System TRS , only the first election round is included. The presidential elections displayed in the Voter Turnout database are elections to the national presidency of a country or territory. The number of registered voters. The figure represents the number of names on the voters' register at the time that the registration process closes cut-off date , as reported by the electoral management body. The total number of votes cast in the relevant election.
Total vote includes valid and invalid votes, as well as blank votes in cases where these are separated from invalid votes. The IDEA Voter Turnout database contains information about three types of elections: national parliamentary elections, national presidential elections and elections to the European Parliament held in all countries that are members of the European Union.
For more information about the types of elections, see parliamentary elections, presidential elections or EU parliamentary elections. A vote needs to fulfil a number of criteria to be considered as valid. The total number of votes cast valid or invalid divided by the number of names on the voters' register, expressed as a percentage. The total number of votes cast valid or invalid divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a percentage.
Choosing the elections The criteria for including an election in the database are the following: That the election was held after Updating the database Since the launch of the voter turnout database, the Electoral Processes Programme at International IDEA has ensured that the data have been regularly updated. FAQ Do you publish turnout statistics for local elections? Where can I find information on electoral systems? Do you have election statistics disaggregated by age, gender or race?
What affects turnout? A number of factors affect how many people turn out to vote. These include institutional factors such as the type of electoral system used and whether voting is compulsory or not. Socio-economic factors such as the literacy rate, the wealth of a nation, its population size, and its "human development" level, and political factors such as the "competitiveness" of the election, have all been proposed as having a direct impact upon voter turnout.
Are there countries in the world which do not practice universal suffrage? There are many countries in the world that do not have democratic elections and where suffrage rights are obviously limited. Which countries in the world practice compulsory voting? A number of countries in the world practice compulsory voting according to their electoral laws. Voting Age Population VAP refers to the total number of potential voters of voting age in a given country. The VAP figure is a rough estimate and it does not take into account the fact that there might be people who are above voting age but still not enfranchised due to legal or systemic barriers.
The estimate gives an approximate figure of the number of eligible people but it does not reflect the exact number. VAP might differ largely from the number of registered people since registration in many countries is voluntary or not accurate. In countries where registration is compulsory and automatic, and based on the civil register, for example as in the Scandinavian countries, the VAP figure and the number of registered voters are quite close. Where can I find some country specific information on election administration and data on electoral practices?
It is a comprehensive and systematic collection of information on every aspect relating to the organisation and implementation of elections.
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